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Extradition – the formal rendition of criminal fugitives between states – is wellknown to be a time-consuming process that often has impacts, minor or major, on
the ability of states to complete prosecution in a timely manner. Thus, the
extradition process can sometimes be at odds with the right to trial within a
reasonable time, which is part of the overall package of fair trial rights enshrined in
international human rights law. In Canada, this right is implemented by paragraph
11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In recent years Canadian
courts have developed a series of principles to be applied to cases where extradition
is involved in claims of trial delay. These range from the prosecution’s obligation to
pursue timely trial in a diligent manner, to the extent to which extradition should
simply be treated as procedurally neutral, to the attribution of delays when an
accused has deliberately left the country to avoid prosecution. This body of case
law is surveyed and analyzed in this article, as a means of providing an illustrative
example of state practice regarding this right. The authors conclude that while
Canadian law on this question is not entirely coherent internally, it generally
complies with international standards.

Introduction
Extradition—the formal rendition of criminal fugitives between states1—is an
indispensable part of the cooperative machinery that underpins the international community’s
ongoing battle against transnational crime. The regime of transnational criminal law that
emerged during the 20th century2 has always had, as a core policy imperative, the need to ensure
that offenders face criminal prosecution before domestic courts which have jurisdiction over
their crimes, and which therefore require jurisdiction over their persons. As crimes and criminals
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1
A more complete definition is “the formal rendition of a criminal fugitive from a state that has custody (the
requested state) to a state that wishes either to prosecute or, if the fugitive has already been convicted of an
offence, to impose a penal sentence (the requesting state)” (Robert J. Currie & Joseph Rikhof, International &
Transnational Criminal Law, 2d ed (Toronto: Irwin, 2013) at 478).
2
See generally Neil Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law, 2d ed (Oxford University Press, 2018).
Though it is worth noting that extradition is one of the most ancient forms of international cooperation, having
emerged as early as ancient Egyptian times: Ivan A Shearer, Extradition in International Law (Ocean Publications,
1971) at 5.
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cross borders, so too must the law enforcement tools that enable their apprehension, and
extradition is one of the foremost tools that facilitate prosecutions.
However, even decades ago it was already described as being “fashionable”3 to
acknowledge the potential issues arising from the need to: make extradition efficient and
effective, on one hand; and on the other hand ensure that the human rights of accused persons are
protected and not violated by the manner in which either the requesting state or the requested
state execute their extradition processes. As extradition is a law enforcement process,
administered by the state, it clearly implicates the civil/procedural rights of people targeted by
investigations. The parameters of how human rights are engaged in the extradition process, and
in international criminal cooperation generally, are less clear and have generated controversy.4 It
is therefore not uncommon to encounter literature5 and case law6 on how various human rights
and rights-related obligations are impacted by extradition, for example the right to life (in death
penalty cases),7 the prohibition against transfer to torture,8 and so on.
A procedural rights issue that gets less attention vis-à-vis extradition is the right of an
accused person to receive a fair trial within a reasonable time. Extradition is well-known to be a
time-consuming process and often has impacts, minor or major, on the ability of the state to
complete prosecution in a timely manner. These impacts in turn engage interesting questions, in
particular what the duties of a state are in actively pursuing extradition and how delays in the
process might factor into determination of whether the right is being respected.
The modest goal of this article is to examine how this issue has played out recently in the
courts of a single state, Canada. Canada is party to major international human rights
instruments,9 has a constitutionalized human rights code in the form of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms,10 and has a robust extradition practice based on a number of bilateral and

3

C. van den Wyngaert, “Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora’s
Box?” (1990) 39 ICLQ 757 at 757.
4
RJ Currie, “The Protection of Human Rights in Transnational Criminal Law” in Neil Boister & Robert J. Currie, eds,
Routledge Handbook of Transnational Criminal Law (Routledge, 2015) 27
5
J Dugard & C. van den Wyngaert, “Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights” (1998) 92 AJIL 187; VP Nanda,
“Bases for Refusing International Extradition Requests: Capital Punishment and Torture” (1999) 23 Fordham Int’l L
J 1369; Joanna Harrington, “The Role for Human Rights Obligations in Canadian Extradition Law” [2005] 43 CYBIL
45
6
The classic case is Soering v. United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439 (ECtHR); and see Kindler v. Canada, Comm No
470/1991, UN Doc CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (1993) (UN Hum Rts Committee); United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 SCR
283 (Sup Ct of Canada)
7
Bharat Malkani, “The Obligation to Refrain from Assisting the Use of the Death Penalty” (2013) 62 ICLQ 523
8
JG Johnston, “The Risk of Torture as a Basis for Refusing Extradition and the Use of Diplomatic Assurances to
Protect Against Torture After 9/11” (2011) 11 ICLR 1
9
Most relevant here is the fact that Canada is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). A complete list of human rights treaties to which Canada is party can be found on
the Government of Canada website, at the following URL: < https://www.canada.ca/en/canadianheritage/services/canada-united-nations-system/treaties.html >
10
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]
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multilateral treaty relationships.11 Accordingly, it is our hope that survey and analysis of how
Canadian law has responded to the interaction between extradition and the right to trial within a
reasonable time will be of interest, and potentially instructive, as an example of state practice
under international human rights law and of the kinds of practical considerations that can arise.

The Right to Trial Within a Reasonable Time
a)

International Human Rights Law

A tired but true old maxim is that “justice delayed is justice denied,” and the obvious
good sense of this truism is reflected in the fact that trial within a reasonable time is a feature of
all of the major international human rights regimes. Of primary concern here is the ICCPR, to
which Canada is a party along with the majority of states in the world.12 Article 14(3)(c) of the
treaty provides that, “In the determination of any criminal charge,” individuals have the right “to
be tried without undue delay.”13 Similarly, the European Convention on Human Rights
guarantees criminal trials “within a reasonable time,”14 with identical wording in article 47 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,15 article 7 of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights,16 and articles 7(5) and 8(1) of the American Convention on Human
Rights.17
The right to trial within a reasonable time is of fairly ancient origin, dating back as early
as the Magna Carta, and has been referred to as “a basic component of civilized legal
systems.”18 In all of the human rights instruments it is contextually included as part of an overall
package of fair trial rights, and the policy rationale which underpins it is quite clear. As
Bassiouni notes, it “limits infringements on personal freedom caused by pretrial and trial
detention,” is “crucial to the guarantee of a fair trial because undue delays may cause the loss of
evidence or the fading of the memories of the witnesses,” and “seeks to minimise the emotional

11

See generally Seth Weinstein & Nancy Dennison, Prosecuting and Defending Extradition Cases (Emond
Montgomery, 2017); Gary Botting, Canadian Extradition Law Practice, 5th ed (LexisNexis, 2015)
12
The ratification status of the ICCPR (which as of October 2018 had 172 parties) can be found on the website of
the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, at the following URL: < http://indicators.ohchr.org/ >
13
This “without undue delay” formulation also appears in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (art. 21(4)(c)), the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (art. 20(4)(c)) and
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (art. 67(1)(c)). See Brian Farrell, “The Right to a Speedy Trial
Before International Criminal Tribunals” (2003) 19 South African J Hum Rts 98.
14
ETS No 5 (1950). This protection actually encompasses both civil and criminal trials, though it is dealt with
differently as regards each; see Frédéric Edel, Human rights files no. 16: The length of civil and criminal proceedings
in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 2d ed (Council of Europe Publishing, 2007)
15
Official Journal of the European Union, C 326 (26 October 2012)
16
OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3, rev. 5 (27 June 1981)
17
OASTS No 36 (22 November 1969)
18
Frank Addario and Megan Savard, “The Fast and the Furious 11(b): Is the Speedy Trial a Dying Franchise?”
(2017) 36 Adv. J. 20.
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strain on the accused caused by pending criminal proceedings.”19 As regards article 14(3)(c) of
the ICCPR specifically, the UN Human Rights Committee has stated:
The right of the accused to be tried without undue delay, provided for by article 14,
paragraph 3 (c), is not only designed to avoid keeping persons too long in a state of
uncertainty about their fate and, if held in detention during the period of the trial, to
ensure that such deprivation of liberty does not last longer than necessary in the
circumstances of the specific case, but also to serve the interests of justice. What is
reasonable has to be assessed in the circumstances of each case, taking into account
mainly the complexity of the case, the conduct of the accused, and the manner in
which the matter was dealt with by the administrative and judicial authorities. In
cases where the accused are denied bail by the court, they must be tried as
expeditiously as possible. This guarantee relates not only to the time between the
formal charging of the accused and the time by which a trial should commence, but
also the time until the final judgement on appeal. All stages, whether in first
instance or on appeal must take place “without undue delay.”20

It is, of course, the responsibility of the state, via its criminal prosecution and judicial
systems, to ensure that the right is upheld, and at least under the ICCPR the burden of proof is on
the state to justify delay, particularly on the basis of the complexity of the case.21 However, it is
clear that a determination of whether a trial has proceeded within a reasonable time can consider
the conduct of the accused person. The Human Rights Committee, for example, has examined
whether an accused’s decision to change lawyers contributed unnecessarily to the delay,22 and in
one case held that the accused’s deliberate evasion of the authorities meant that most of the delay
was not attributable to the state.23 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights incorporates
the accused’s conduct as part of its overall consideration of how delay impacts upon the
“reasonableness” of the time the prosecution consumed.24 It has noted that while there is no
obligation on the accused to cooperate with the authorities to advance the prosecution or to avoid
any of the resources provided to him/her under the national law, a “determination to be
obstructive” can count against him/her,25 as can other kind of delays including failure or lateness
of filing pleadings, absconding from the jurisdiction, failure to appear, bogus filings, etc.26
The upshot, then, is that unnecessary delay by the accused does not count against the
state, in terms of how long the clock of delay has run. As will be explored below, this is an
19

M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural
Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions” (1999) 3 Duke J Comp & Int’l L 235 at 285.
20
UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 32, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), para. 35
21
Smantser v. Belarus, UN Doc No CCPR/C/94/D/1178/2003 (2008)
22
M. and B. Hill v. Spain, UN Doc A/52/40 (1997), para. 12.4.
23
Pavlovna Smirnova v. Russian Federation, UN Doc No C/81/D/712/1996 (1996).
24
Case of Kemmache v. France, judgment of 27 November 1991, Series A, No. 218, p. 20, para. 50; Frydlender v.
France [GC], 27 June 2000, §43
25
Case of Yagci and Sargin v. Turkey, judgment of 8 June 1995, Series A, No. 319-A, p. 21, para. 66
26
Edel, above note 14 at 51-57.
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important factor in Canadian proceedings, and with particular regard to extradition has produced
interesting results.

b)

Canadian Law

Paragraph 11(b) of the Charter states that “any person charged with an offence has the
right […] to be tried within a reasonable time”, which is indeed similar to the protections offered
by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the American Bill of Rights.27
Some would argue that this paragraph of the Charter is highly misunderstood and that it has few
defenders,28 and it has certainly been the locus of much procedural and constitutional wrangling
since the introduction of the Charter in 1982.
The framework to be applied to determine if this right has been violated has received
constant attention from the Supreme Court of Canada over the years since 1986, when the Court
first considered this provision.29 Without reviewing all the decisions from the Supreme Court on
this matter, three major periods can be identified and detailed. First, some general considerations
must be addressed.30
As per the text of the provision, for the protection to be engaged the individual must be
charged with an offence, meaning that an information has been sworn against him or that a direct
indictment has been laid31. Furthermore, the term “offence” has been interpreted to mean “public
offences involving punitive sanctions” 32. This means that the right to be tried within a
reasonable time does not apply to all court proceedings33.
The first period in the Supreme Court literature on this question starts with Mills,
Rahey34, and Conway35. While the Court was not unanimous on this matter, the principles were
eventually harmonized in Smith36. In that decision, after having discussed issues about
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court confirmed that a fifteen-month delay between the laying of the
charge and the beginning of the preliminary inquiry was unreasonable. To reach this conclusion,
the Court used a four-step analysis that considered, “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for
27

Only one year after the Charter was adopted, the Canadian protection against unreasonable delay was deemed
to be similar to the American one, with some minor differences, most notably because the pre-indictment delay
can be considered in the United States, but not in Canada. Walter S. Tarnopolsky, “The New Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms as Compared and Contrasted with the American Bill of Rights” (1983) 5 Hum. Rts. Q. 227, at
240.
28
Frank Addario and Megan Savard, “The Fast and the Furious 11(b): Is the Speedy Trial a Dying Franchise?”,
(2017) 36 Adv. J. No. 1 20.
29
R. v. Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863 [hereinafter Mills].
30
See also Steve Coughlan and Robert J. Currie, “Sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Canadian Charter” (2013) 62
S.C.L.R. (2d) 143, at 184-187, for a pre-Jordan account.
31
R. v. Kalanj, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1594.
32
R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541, at 554.
33
Couglan and Currie, above, note 30, at 185-186.
34
R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588 [hereinafter Rahey].
35
R. v. Conway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659 [hereinafter Conway].
36
R. v. Smith, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1120 [hereinafter Smith].
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the delay, including limits on institutional resources and the inherent time requirements of the
case; (3) waiver of time periods; and (4) prejudice to the accused.”37 One year later, in Askov38,
the Court was somewhat divided again on this matter, most notably on the question of the
societal interest of seeing trials held within a reasonable time. The Court also suggested that a six
to eight months guideline, from committal to the start of the trial, “might be deemed to be the
outside limit of what is reasonable.”39
The Smith test was later modified, or rather refined, in Morin40, which marks the start of
the second period of the Supreme Court’s analysis of paragraph 11(b) of the Charter. In Morin,
the Court confirmed that society had indeed an interest, albeit secondary, “in seeing that the least
fortunate of its citizens who are accused of crimes are treated humanely and fairly, [and that]
trials held promptly enjoy the confidence of the public.”41 The Court also recognized that the
interests of the accused will sometime clash with the societal interest in law enforcement, most
importantly in case of serious crimes42.
Although the Smith test was preserved in its essence by Morin, some corrections were
implemented by the Court, mainly because the Askov guidelines had caused some serious
problems in the criminal court system. The test was thus modified and required the balancing of
four factors: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) waiver of time periods; (3) the reasons for the delay,
including (a) inherent time requirements of the case, (b) actions of the accused, (c) actions of the
Crown,43 (d) limits on institutional resources, and (e) other reasons for delay; and (4) prejudice to
the accused.”44 While the application of the test remained discretionary, the Supreme Court
definitely aimed to harmonize the various court decisions on this subject. Furthermore, the Askov
guidelines were modified and raised to a period between eight and ten months for provincial
courts45. However, the Court did stress the importance that these guidelines are flexible and to be
adapted to the circumstances of the various provinces and regions in Canada46.
Some seventeen years after Morin, the Supreme Court once again addressed the issue of
unreasonable delays in Godin47. In Godin, the Supreme Court unanimously held that prejudice
could be inferred from the delay and that Justice Sopinka had been right to state in Morin that
“[t]he longer the delay the more likely that such an inference will be drawn.”48 While Godin did
37

Smith, ibid, at 1131.
R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 [hereinafter Askov].
39
Ibid., at 1240.
40
R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771 [hereinafter Morin].
41
Morin, above, note 40, at 786.
42
Ibid., at 787.
43
In Canada, as in the British system, both the federal and provincial prosecution services are referred to as “the
Crown.”
44
Morin, above note 40, at 787-788.
45
Ibid., at 799. In Canada, even though all criminal law is federal, jurisdiction over criminal offences is divided
between the provincial courts (which are constituted by the provinces) and the superior courts (which are constituted
by the federal government but administered by the provinces). A more narrow range of more serious offences,
including all jury trials, are held in the superior courts.
46
Id., at 799-800.
47
R. v. Godin, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Godin].
48
Ibid., at par. 31, citing Morin, above, note 40, at 801.
38
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not modify the applicable test, it did shift the attitude towards prejudice in a manner favourable
to the accused.49
More recently, amid rising dissatisfaction with delays in criminal cases, a complete
overhaul of the parameters to be applied was set out by the Supreme Court in Jordan,50 which
marks the start of the third and last period in the Supreme Court’s analysis of paragraph 11(b) of
the Charter. The majority in Jordan noted that the application of the Morin framework had
caused some major problems in the criminal justice system “contributing to a culture of delay
and complacency towards it.”51 Indeed, the criminal justice system had been plagued by
inefficient and unnecessary procedure, causing some major delays in the system, but also a
general sentiment that these delays were inevitable and justifiable. The majority also found that
the existing framework was too unpredictable and that the treatment of the prejudice aspect of
the test was confusing. Thus, a new approach was put forward.
This new framework is based on a presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial courts
and 30 months for superior courts. This delay represents the total delay from the laying of the
charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial, minus the defence delay (which is composed of
the delay waiver by the defence and any delay caused solely by the defence in an illegitimate
way52). If this delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, the Crown will bear the onus of proving
that the delay is nonetheless reasonable by establishing the presence of exceptional
circumstances53, which could arise from a “discrete event” like an extradition proceeding54 or
from a particularly complex case55. A contrario, if the delay is less than the presumptive ceiling
and the accused still believes it is unreasonable, he will need to establish that fact. He will be
able to do so by proving that he tried to expedite the procedures and that the case should not have
taken so long.56 Finally, Jordan also created a transitional exceptional circumstance57, “intended
to blunt the impact of the new time limits and account for reasonable reliance on the previous
delay jurisprudence.”58
By establishing a presumptive ceiling, the Jordan framework removes the question of
prejudice from the analysis. However, the prejudice “informs the setting of the presumptive
ceiling.”59 Thus, once the ceiling is contravened, it is fair to presume that the accused’s rights,
notably his liberty and security rights, were infringed. The Jordan framework has had major

49

Coughlan and Currie, above, note 30, at 193.
R. v. Jordan, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631.
51
Ibid., at para. 29.
52
Id., at para. 61-65.
53
Id., at para. 48.
54
Id., at para. 72 and 81.
55
Id., at para. 71.
56
Id., at para. 49.
57
Id., at para. 95-102. See also R. v. Williamson, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 741 (rendered at the same time as Jordan and
providing an application of the transitional exceptional circumstance).
58
Matthew R. Gourlay, “After Jordan: The Fate of the Speedy Trial and Prospects for Systemic Reform” (2017) 36
Adv. J. 22, at para. 16.
59
Jordan, above, note 51, at para. 54.
50

7

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3374473

consequences across Canada60, causing numerous stays of proceedings61. However, in the long
term, it is hoped that Jordan will have reduced overall delays, resulting in fewer stays under
paragraph 11(b).62
The importance of the mentality change intended to be wrought by Jordan was further
stressed in Cody63, where the Court tried to put critiques of the Jordan framework to rest64. The
Court, unanimously this time, refused to modify the Jordan framework, stating that a Supreme
Court precedent cannot be lightly discarded of overruled65. Cody also brought some additional
considerations about defence delay,66 most notably that not every delay caused by the defence
must be deducted under this component67. Effectively, an accused has the right to make full
answer and defence, which allows him to take legitimate action to respond to the charges laid
against him. The only defence delay that is deductible is that which is: “(1) is solely or directly
caused by the accused person; and (2) flows from defence action that is illegitimate insomuch as
it is not taken to respond to the charges.”68 The determination of what consists a legitimate
action, or inaction, is a highly discretionary decision to be made by the first instance judge,
whose finding is deserving of deference upon appellate review.69 The Court in Cody also stresses
the importance of the proposition that “[d]efence counsel may still pursue all available
substantive and procedural means to defend their client. What defence counsel are not permitted
to do is to engage in illegitimate conduct and then have it count towards the Jordan ceiling.”70
Since Cody, it seems that the efforts have since been focused on applying the new
framework to the criminal justice system and on resolving the issues that arose from its

60

It is said that about 6% of all charges completed in provincial court and 15% of all charges completed in superior
court in 2015/2016 are over the presumptive ceiling established in Jordan. While this statistic does not necessarily
mean that a stay of proceeding was granted or even requested, it does show that the criminal justice system will need
to adapt to the Jordan framework. Ashley Maxwell, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada, “Adult
criminal court processing times, Canada, 2015/2016” (February 2018). ISSN 1209-6393.
61
For an application of Jordan in the province of Quebec see: Laura Ellyson, “Revue jurisprudentielle : les suites de
l’arrêt Jordan au Québec”, Repères, June 2017, EYB2017REP2253. For an application in the province of Ontario,
see: Cristin Schmitz, “‘Robust’ approach to timely trials, says defence lawyer” (2016) The Lawyers Weekly, Vol.
36, No. 22. See also Judge Wayne Gorman, “R. v. Jordan: Its Effect on Cases Already in the System” (2017) 64
C.L.Q. 240, for a list of cases applying the Jordan framework.
62
Steve Coughlan, “Early Patterns in the New Section 11(b) Framework” (2016) 32 CR-ART 386, at 3.
63
R. v. Cody, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 659.
64
And indeed, the Jordan framework was extensively critiqued. See inter alia Leonid Sirota, “Was the Supreme
Court Right to Change the Law on the Right to a Speedy Trial” (2017) 26 Const. F. 1.
65
Id., at para. 3, citing Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, at para. 38 and Carter v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, at para. 44.
66
Christopher Sherrin, “R. v. Cody: What does Cody add to Jordan?” (2017) 37 CR-ART 289.
67
Cody, above, note 63, at para. 29.
68
Ibid at para 30
69
Ibid., at para. 31.
70
Ibid., at para. 34.
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application71, among others, the classification of the delay caused by the decision rendering
process72 or different strategies to render the criminal justice system more efficient73.

Extradition in Canadian Law
A brief word should be said about Canadian extradition law.74 Canada tends to administer
its inter-state extradition relations by way of bilateral treaty, though it is also party to a number
of criminal suppression conventions that contain extradition obligations, as well as to
“reciprocal” arrangements with foreign states (typically Commonwealth countries).75 The treaty
obligations are implemented, and the law administered, under the Extradition Act,76 which is a
complete code of law and procedure.
While the bulk of extradition law in Canada involves extraditing individuals from
Canada, most relevant here is the issue of extradition to Canada. The determination to seek
extradition is made by prosecutors at either the provincial or federal level, and requests are made
with the assistance and through the office of the International Assistance Group (IAG), a
specialized department of the federal department of Justice which acts as the delegate of the
powers of the Minister of Justice in extradition matters. Pursuant to Part 3 of the Extradition Act,
the IAG is empowered to communicate with the authorities of foreign states from which Canada
seeks extradition and make formal diplomatic requests for surrender of individuals. That said,
Canadian police and prosecutors do communicate with their foreign counterparts via informal
networks, as is increasingly typical in international practice, and references in the case law to
what information was known, obtained (or failed to be obtained) by “the Crown” may mask a
complex network of intra- and inter-governmental information gathering and exchange.

Extradition in s. 11(b) Proceedings
a) The “Prince Principles”
Relative to the overall amount of criminal litigation in Canada, extradition is an
infrequent process. Canada extradites individuals to foreign states far more frequently than it
seeks extradition, and the 11(b) cases involving extradition are by no means numerous; the
decisions revealed by our research are mostly from 2000 or later. Nonetheless, there is an

See on this subject: Steve Coughlan, “Patterns in the Jordan Case Law One Year after Cody” (2018) 42 CR (7th)
342 and Christopher Sherrin, “Understanding and Applying the New Approach to Charter Claims of Unreasonable
Delay” (2017) 22 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 1.
72
Oliver Fitzgerald, “Jordan and Classifying Decision Delay: A Need for Guidance”, (2017) 40 CR-ART 72.
73
Chris de Sa, “Understanding R. v. Jordan: A New Era for 11(b)”, (2017) ADGN/RP-255, at para. 17; Gourlay,
above, note 58, at para. 27 and following; Coughlan, above, note 62; Addario and Savard, above, note 28, at 3.
74
See generally Currie & Rikhof, above note 1, c. 9; Weinstein, above note 11; Botting, above note 11.
75
Justice Canada, “Extradition Requests by Canada,” online: < https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/emla-eej/bycanparcan.html >
76
S.C. 1999, c. 18
71
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interesting body of case law that has developed, which both pre- and post-dates the Supreme
Court’s Jordan framework.
In the recent case of R. v. Prince,77 Justice Suhail Akhtar of the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice heard and dismissed a defence motion for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) due to
Crown delay. The decision is unremarkable except for two features: first, it is one of the
reasonably unusual cases where an extradition process figured into the 11(b) analysis; and
second, Justice Akhtar surveyed some of the relevant case law and produced a tidy 4-point
distillation of the relevant considerations when extradition is considered in the 11(b) context, as
follows:
The authorities disclose a set of principles that must be adhered to in analysing the
existence of a legitimate s. 11(b) violation. First, there is no obligation on an
accused person who has left the jurisdiction to surrender themselves to the
authorities or otherwise facilitate their return to Canada. Second, if the authorities
are fully aware of an accused's location outside Canada, it is incumbent upon them
to act as expeditiously as possible to bring the accused to trial. Third, if an accused
person deliberately flees the jurisdiction and makes attempts to conceal his
whereabouts or otherwise frustrate the Crown's ability to extradite him or her their
actions are counted as defence delay in the s. 11(b) context. Fourth, where delay is
caused by the need to extradite an accused, this may constitute a discrete event:
Jordan, at paras. 72, 81.78

We will use this list as the focal point of our discussion below, tracing how they are or
are not reflected in the case law, even though there might be subsets of criteria that we encounter
in the case law, and even though we might not agree entirely with them as “principles”. As a
prefatory point, it is worth recalling the questions that Jordan compels in these cases involving
extradition, and to which the “Prince principles” are geared: in adding up the period of delay
(usually measured in months), what kinds of conduct are counted against the Crown? What kinds
of delay will be attributed to the defence and thus subtracted from the Crown’s total? And what
situations are properly treated as “discrete events,” out of the Crown’s control and thus not
counted as part of the delay?

b) Principle 1: Accused Need Not Surrender or Facilitate His/Her Own Return
The first principle is well exemplified in R. v. MacIntosh79. In this decision, the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal stressed the importance of the fact that “there is no duty on an accused to bring
him or herself to trial.”
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In MacIntosh, the accused had moved to India before charges were laid against him and
was not made aware of their existence until a few years later. When he was indeed made aware of
the charges, he informed the police officer in charge of his file that he had no intention of returning
to Canada. Eventually, the accused was extradited some twelve years after the charges were laid,
after a lengthy extradition process.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge had made a mistake by deciding that
the accused had the responsibility of coming back to Canada and that he could not hold the Crown
responsible for the delay, having caused it himself. To reach this conclusion, the Court of Appeal
relied on the decision R. v. Beason80 and most importantly on Askov, where Justice Cory wrote:
“[i]t must be remembered that it is the duty of the Crown to bring the accused to trial. It is the
Crown which is responsible for the provision of facilities and staff to see that the accused persons
are tried in a reasonable time.”81 Contrary to what happened in R. v. R.E.M.82, the accused in
MacIntosh did not seek to avoid prosecution by moving out of the country. Thus, he was not
responsible for the delay and a stay of proceedings was warranted in his case83.
The Court in MacIntosh held that the inaction of the accused can only be relevant on the
prejudice aspect of the 11b) inquiry84. However, this is less relevant now because of the new
Jordan framework that does not rely on actual prejudice, rather on a presumption of prejudice.

c) Principles 2 & 3: Crown Must Seek Accused’s Return…Unless Accused Has Fled or is
Avoiding Capture
In a way, the second of the Prince principles is a corollary of the first: since it is the duty
of the state to bring people to trial and to ensure that happens within a reasonable time, then
logically the Crown must seek extradition or make other attempts to facilitate the accused’s
return. Yet Justice Akhtar’s precise wording (“if the authorities are fully aware of an accused's
location outside Canada, it is incumbent upon them to act as expeditiously as possible to bring
the accused to trial”) correctly reflects the fact that this duty is not absolute, but rather must
simply be exercised with a degree of diligence. If the Crown has proceeded with reasonable
dispatch, then the extradition phase of a case is either treated as a “discrete event” and as neutral,
or can be used by the Crown to justify any time by which the presumptive ceiling has been
exceeded.
A finding that extradition-related delays were “unreasonable” stem from situations where
the Crown either unreasonably did not pursue extradition, or failed to do so in a reasonable
manner. R. v. Arsenault85 is a good example of the former kind of case, which typically results in
80
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a stay being granted. The accused moved from Canada to South Korea for work purposes, at a
time when he was (unbeknownst to him) under investigation. He was there for nearly eight years,
until the government of Canada revoked his passport (at the request of the police) and he
returned to Canada, where he was immediately arrested. The record was clear that despite
knowing where the accused was the Crown never sought extradition, and the failure to do so was
primarily based on speculation by the police that the accused might return on his own accord or
would be deported from South Korea.86 Even the decision to revoke his passport was only made
after seven years had passed. All of this showed lack of reasonable diligence on the part of the
Crown. The court pointedly noted that even though the accused became aware towards the end of
the period that a warrant had been issued for his arrest, he was under no obligation to return.
Similarly, in R. v. Gill87 the accused had moved to India in 2003 and was charged in
2004. Aside from recording the arrest warrant in the Canadian Police Information Centre
database, the Crown took no action until the accused returned to Canada for family business in
2013, when he was arrested. The court attributed the entire delay to the Crown’s inaction: despite
there being a Canada-India extradition treaty, and despite the fact that the Crown knew exactly
where the accused was located and was in touch with the Indian authorities, no effort had been
made to have him extradited. Nor did they even revoke his passport, which he renewed twice
during the decade he was in India.
In R. v. Lee,88 by contrast, the police pursued a strategy of attempting to convince the
accused to return to Canada from Mexico of her own accord rather than seeking extradition, and
the Court of Appeal found this to be a reasonable approach. This finding rested on the
combination of several facts, in particular that: the police did not know where in Mexico the
accused was located and she refused to disclose this; despite knowing of the charges against her
she made many demands of the Crown and the police over the course of several months of
communication; and she continually hinted that she would be returning to Canada of her own
accord. In such a case, the Court noted, “The Crown must exercise reasonable diligence, but
it does not need to undertake immediate extradition proceedings once a person is charged
with an offence.” 89
The facts of cases where the Crown did seek extradition but proceeded “unreasonably,”
with a lack of diligence, tend to reflect mostly bureaucratic inertia and delay, sometimes verging
on apparent incompetence. MacIntosh90 is the most notorious of these in Canadian history. Over
a decade’s worth of delay in the extradition process led to the accused’s convictions for sexual
assault against children being vacated by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, on the basis that the
trial judge should have granted the accused’s motion for a stay under s. 11(b). A stay in the face
of such heinous charges led to a significant public uproar that sparked internal governmental
inquiries; in the end, reports were released by both the government of the province of Nova
86
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Scotia91 and the government of Canada92 that detailed delays in the process even beyond what
had been found in the case itself. The picture painted in the Court of Appeal’s judgment and in
the government reports is not flattering to any of the Crown actors involved. The Crown knew
exactly where the accused was, at all relevant times, yet inexplicably delayed extradition for
years. The accused traveled freely to and from Canada. The reviews of the process display
periods of inertia, lack of knowledge and unexplained delay, including an oddly unsuccessful
attempt to revoke the accused’s passport.93
In R. v. Barra and Govindia,94 Crown inaction on drafting affidavits required for
extradition resulted in 4 months of an 11-month period being treated as unreasonable delay. The
motions judge held that periods of time had gone by where drafting was simply not being done,
and for which there was no explanation offered by the Crown. However, the 4-month delay was
not sufficient to render the Crown’s overall delay “unreasonable” and the stay was not granted.
Some cases, however, demonstrate that there are limits on how far the courts will expect
the Crown to go in its attempts to engage extradition. In R. v. Singleton95 the British Columbia
Court of Appeal reviewed Canadian and U.S. case law, including MacIntosh, and explained the
standard of diligence expected of the Crown as follows:
while the state has an obligation to act with reasonable diligence to bring an accused
who is outside of Canada to trial within a reasonable time, whether that obligation
has been met is to be determined contextually, considering the investigative avenues
available to the police force or investigating agency involved. When an accused is
in a foreign country from which he or she can be extradited and his or her
whereabouts are known, Canadian prosecution officials are obligated to pursue
extradition in a reasonable and timely manner. If they fail to do so then, as
in MacIntosh, the ensuing delay will be attributed to the Crown.96
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In Singleton the accused, an American, had returned to the U.S. before charges were laid
against him in Canada. After the accused was charged in 1997, a new police officer was assigned
to the investigation and this officer spent several months on the case in 1998, determining that
the accused was connected to a town in Texas. Local authorities indicated that the accused had
been in that town but had left for parts unknown, and the Canadian police officer turned his
attention to another case, for four years. Returning to the Singleton case in late 2002, he found a
reference to the accused’s sister in existing file materials and managed to find her through an
internet search; she provided information about the whereabouts of the accused who had been
living openly under his own name in Kansas. An extradition request took eight months to draft
and was sent a month later.
At trial after his extradition (and more procedural wrangling), the accused unsuccessfully
applied for a stay under 11(b), based chiefly on the four-year gap in the investigation between
1998 and 2002. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had erred in attributing this time to
the accused on the basis that he did not voluntarily return to Canada to face the charges, applying
Prince principle #1, discussed above. However, the issue was what was required of the Crown
“when an accused is outside of Canada and his or her whereabouts are unknown.”97 Here, the
Court held, the police having learned in 1998 that the accused had left the Texas town and with
no idea where he had gone, it was reasonable to suspend the investigation: “Attempting to locate
someone in a country as vast as the United States without any idea of where to look is akin to
trying to find the proverbial needle in a haystack.”98 The police had no “leads” until the
investigator spoke to the sister in 2002, and it was only at this time they had any idea where to
look, after which they proceeded with reasonable diligence to have him extradited.
There is certainly some force to the point that in a situation where the police have
exhausted their current evidence and cannot practically obtain any new “leads,” a period of
inactivity may be reasonable. Singleton is dubious on its facts, however, in that the investigator
had information about the accused’s sister in 1998 but did not follow it up until 2002. The officer
testified that “the RCMP computer system available to him in 1998 did not permit Internet
searches. He was not asked when such searches could be conducted on that system,” seemingly
to explain why he did not seek out the sister in 1998. This is faintly ridiculous, given that as most
Canadian adults would recall, “Internet searches” were widely available in 1998—to university
students, administrative assistants, lawyers, library patrons and even criminals. The Court of
Appeal strained this point even further by remarking, “there is no evidence as to when the
information that led Sergeant Quenneville to [the sister] became accessible on the Internet,”99
suggesting that the burden of proof was in fact on the accused to establish that this constituted
lack of diligence.100 One is left with the impression that the Crown is given an extremely
generous amount of leeway.
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A similar approach is seen in Prince101 itself where the accused, who was being
investigated by Toronto police, went to Jamaica in June 2014, prompting the Crown to charge
him and issue an arrest warrant in September 2014. In June 2015 Jamaican authorities contacted
Canadian authorities, indicating that the accused was in Jamaica and that they were prepared to
arrest him on the Canadian warrant. Extradition proceedings ended when the accused voluntarily
returned to Canada for trial.
On his 11(b) motion the accused argued that the September 2014-June 2015 period
amounted to unreasonable delay, given that the accused was known to be in Jamaica (which is,
one might remark parenthetically, not a huge country). Justice Akhtar accepted what is in our
view a somewhat lame Crown argument, to the effect that the investigating officer “knew that
the applicant had travelled to Montego Bay but did not know if he was still in Jamaica or if he
had travelled elsewhere,” and that the accused was known to sometimes travel between Canada
and Jamaica, which added to the uncertainty.102 It seems only reasonable that the Crown might
nonetheless have made some inquiries with Jamaican authorities—particularly since those same
authorities a) clearly knew about the Canadian arrest warrant, and b) eventually contacted the
Crown to flag the accused’s presence.
Justice Akhtar based his finding on the perfectly reasonable proposition that “[t]he police
have a limited budget and resources. Imposing an obligation that would require them to conduct
international searches for an accused who has gone missing is both impractical and undesirable,”
in support of which he cited Singleton.103 The police, he ruled, “did not know how or where to
find the applicant.”104 Yet the alleged impracticability of seeking out the accused in Prince
seems even more dubious than in Singleton; “conducting international searches” might very well
have been an unreasonable burden for the Crown, but surely a phone call to Jamaican authorities
to at least attempt to locate a particular individual who was known to have gone there would not
have been too onerous. If it was possible he had left Jamaica for Canada, a simple passport check
would have revealed this.
As the third Prince principle suggests, the judicial tone of sympathy towards Crown
interests warms up completely in cases where the accused has fled the jurisdiction to avoid
criminal proceedings or “makes attempts to conceal his whereabouts or otherwise frustrate the
Crown's ability to extradite him or her.”105 These cases are interesting because their results
appear to turn on judicial findings regarding the accused’s subjective intention to actually evade
prosecution. Intuitively this makes a certain amount of sense, since it is this kind of delay that
cannot reasonably be said to the be fault of the Crown; so long as the Crown is proceeding with
reasonable diligence, then delay caused by the accused’s deliberate actions cannot be said to be
the responsibility of the state. As Justice Sopinka wrote in Morin, “(a)ction or non-action by the
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accused which is inconsistent with a desire for a timely trial is something that the court must
consider.”106 The devil, of course, is in the details of the cases.
R. c. Terk107 is a fairly clean application of this principle. Aware that he was under
investigation for fraud, Terk returned to his home country of Israel. He was charged some
months after but an extradition request foundered because Israel does not extradite its citizens.
Years later, he returned to Canada and was eventually arrested. The Court of Appeal dismissed
Terk’s 11(b) motion on the basis that he had fled Canada to escape prosecution. It rejected his
suggestion that the delay was attributable to the Crown because they should, instead of
attempting extradition, have tried to convince him to return voluntarily:
Imposing such an obligation would certainly not be without consequences; we could
even imagine cases where the accused, informed by telephone, letter or otherwise,
about charges against him in Canada, would take advantage of this to move or
change his identity, thereby rendering any future extradition proceedings much less
effective.108
A similar case is R. v. White109 where the accused fled to the U.S. in 1986, when he
became aware he was being investigated for tax evasion, a non-extraditable offence (with which
he was charged in 1987). With the help of various U.S. agencies the Canadian police eventually
tracked the accused’s location to California, though this was not until 1989. At that point he was
charged with fraud and extradition was sought and completed. The Court of Appeal rejected his
argument that the delay from 1987 to 1989 should be attributed to the Crown, holding:
Because White knew charges were outstanding against him yet refused to return to
Canada, tell the Crown where he was or even contact the Crown through a third
party, the delay must be attributable to him unless the Crown knew his whereabouts
and deliberately delayed apprehending him or did not diligently bring him to
trial: see U.S. v. Deleon. The evidence before the trial judge reasonably supported
his findings that the Crown had taken reasonable steps to find White and that the
Crown did not know where White lived until late March 1989.110

The result in White seems logical, particularly because the Crown proceeded with diligence
and White himself had clearly left Canada to avoid prosecution on the original tax evasion
charges, which caused the delay stemming from the efforts to find him.111 Yet by emphasizing
(albeit in obiter dicta) White’s refusal to return or to be in touch with the Crown, the Court
appears to be undermining the first of the Prince principles, that the accused is under no duty to
bring himself to trial. The suggestion that he should—for some reason—facilitate his own
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prosecution flies in the face of basic Charter values and human rights precepts: it is the task of
the prosecution to arrest the accused. While some effect can reasonably be given to deliberate
evasion by the accused, focusing on his lack of proactive cooperation with a government trying
to imprison him seems to prejudice the analysis.
R. v. James112 is even more troubling. Wanted for murder, the accused had fled to the U.S.
illegally and ended up being imprisoned there for an unrelated crime. The officer in charge of his
case was preoccupied with another investigation and paid only occasional attention to the James
matter, and this lack of attention was amplified when the officer learned that James was
imprisoned in the US and would not be released for some years. He did not seek legal advice
from Crown lawyers about the possibility of having James temporarily extradited for trial. The
trial judge, while describing the officer’s conduct as “not reasonable and…not duly diligent,”113
declined to give any weight whatsoever to the years of delay that resulted. The fact that the
accused had left Canada to avoid being arrested overwhelmed the analysis.
In R. v. R.E.M.,114 the accused was a U.S. national who in 1988 was charged with sexual
assault in British Columbia. He returned to his home in Everett, in the state of Washington, U.S.
(which geographically is located immediately below the province of British Columbia) and,
relying on a lawyer’s advice to the effect that he would probably not be extradited, remained
there. Beyond not returning to British Columbia, he did not hide or evade attention. In the years
after, several more complainants came forward alleging they had been assaulted by the accused,
and in 1995 the investigating officer wrote to the IAG and requested that extradition be pursued.
However, nothing was done until 2002 when an extradition request was made and the accused
was extradited in 2003.
This made for a 16-year delay between the laying of the charge and the beginning of trial,
and the accused applied for a dismissal under 11(b). The trial judge was unsympathetic, oddly
holding that “[i]t is true that the Canadian authorities should have been more diligent in having
him extradited but failure to do that on an expedited basis is not the reason for the delay.”115
Rather, “it was the accused who decided to flee from Canada to avoid prosecution for these
offences….it is evident that the accused has shown a lack of concern with the pace of
litigation. In fact, it is fair to say that by his actions in fleeing the jurisdiction of the court he has
encouraged the delay.”116 So far as the failure by the Crown to pursue extradition for 14 years,
with no explanation and in a situation where the accused’s address in the U.S. could easily have
been obtained,117 the trial judge simply described it as “puzzling”118 but essentially irrelevant.
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Most recently, the case of R. v. Burke119 presented an interesting combination of the
factors being discussed here. The accused had been charged with sexual offences in 1986 but
fled to the U.S., explicitly to avoid prosecution.120 He committed unrelated offences there and in
1988 was sentenced to 52 years in prison. In 2000 Canadian authorities were informed that
Burke would be eligible for parole in 2013. At this time, the Canada-U.S. extradition treaty did
not permit “temporary surrender,” under which an accused imprisoned in the requested state can
be temporarily surrendered for trial in the requesting state, then sent back to the requested state
to finish his sentence. A temporary surrender provision was inserted into the treaty in 2003, but
the Crown did not seek the accused’s extradition. He was paroled in 2015 and deported to
Canada, at which point he was arrested on the original charges.
The accused argued that the 12.5 year failure of the Crown to seek extradition once the
treaty amendment came into effect was unreasonable and led to a breach of s. 11(b). While the
argument was successful before the trial judge, the Court of Appeal reversed this decision.
Without any real analysis of the facts, the Court simply held that because Burke had fled Canada
to avoid prosecution, this amounted to “illegitimate defence delay,” which did not count against
the Crown. It remarked: “[the delay] was caused directly by the respondent, whose actions were
not taken to respond to the charges, but were intended to frustrate them.”121
In our view, a problem with cases like James, R.E.M. and Burke (and, at least in obiter,
White) is that where an accused has absconded or attempted to evade capture, this seems
automatically to absolve the Crown of its obligation to pursue prosecution with diligence and
dispatch. Recall the statement of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Singleton: “When an
accused is in a foreign country from which he or she can be extradited and his or her
whereabouts are known, Canadian prosecution officials are obligated to pursue extradition in a
reasonable and timely manner.”122 Does this obligation of diligence end just because the accused
has absconded? Burke certainly suggests so, since for 12.5 years the Crown knew exactly where
Burke was located and could easily have had him extradited, but simply chose not to do so.
There was nothing “reasonable” or “timely” about the post-2003 delay. James and R.E.M. are
only slightly less stark.
Yet as noted in the above discussion of White, this appears to undermine the first of the
Prince principles, that it is the duty of the Crown to pursue prosecution; the accused is not
required to help the Crown prosecute him. The Crown either has this duty or it does not; and
bringing in the second of the Prince principles, it is illogical to say that the Crown has a duty of
diligence unless the accused is making it more difficult, at which point the Crown has a “get out
of 11(b) free” card to play.
This is not to say that the accused should suffer no consequences when he displays, as the
Supreme Court put it in Cody, “marked inefficiency or marked indifference toward delay.”123 In
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principle, as the Court of Appeal noted in Burke, “the defence is not allowed to ‘engage in
illegitimate conduct and then have it count towards the Jordan ceiling.’”124 An accused should
wear the chains he forges by deliberately dragging out the process through absconding or
evasion. This is a familiar principle in the criminal law of many states, including Canada where
the Criminal Code explicitly provides that where an accused absconds during his trial, it may
continue in his absence.125
However, the reasoning in the Burke-type cases is dangerous because it ignores an
important underpinning of the right to trial within a reasonable time. As the Human Rights
Committee has noted, one of the goals of the right is “to serve the interests of justice.”126 The
duty of the state is not just to ensure that there is a trial someday, but to get the trial going as
early as possible so that with the passage of time evidence does not decay, witness memories do
not fade, documents are not lost or destroyed, etc. In Burke itself there was simply no reason for
the accused to moulder in a U.S. prison while the Crown’s case against him atrophied. Permitting
the Crown to put the case on the backburner in cases where this is not necessary undercuts two
important public interests: 1) ensuring that individuals get fair treatment in the criminal process;
and 2) ensuring that the public receives trials that are more likely to be successfully adjudicated
on their merits, and not hamstrung by the various problems that come with trying to prosecute
offences many years after the investigation concludes.
There is a final, if indirect, public policy justification for keeping the analytical emphasis
on the state’s duty to proceed expeditiously. In these kinds of cases, one of the primary facts is
that the Crown is aware that a person accused in Canada of (what is usually) a serious crime is at
large in a foreign state. In light of cases like James (serial child sexual abuser) and Burke
(convicted murderer), it is worth giving consideration to the protection of the public in that
foreign state as well.127 This would not be so much a matter of constitutional duty but of comity
between states in the fight against transnational crime. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada128
and the Ontario Court of Appeal129 have suggested that this sort of comity is a powerful legal
principle in matters relating to the exercise of Canada’s criminal jurisdiction.
Thus, we suggest that the third Prince principle is mis-cast, since the focus should be on
whether the Crown was exercising reasonable diligence. It could be re-stated as follows: if an
accused person deliberately flees the jurisdiction and makes attempts to conceal his whereabouts
or otherwise frustrate the Crown's ability to extradite him or her, their actions are counted as
defence delay, so long as the Crown continues to exercise reasonable diligence in its pursuit of
the accused. This would allow for decisions like Terk and White, where the accused’s actions
actually prevented the Crown from acting more quickly, but deter situations like James, R.E.M.
and Burke where the Crown unnecessarily abandoned its pursuit of the case for periods of time.
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d) Principle 4: Delay Caused by Need to Extradite is a “Discrete Event”
As previously mentioned, Jordan specifically mentions that the extradition process itself
qualifies as a discrete event, thus justifying a delay that otherwise would be unreasonable.130 To
some extent this must stem from the fact that once the extradition request is in the hands of the
requested state, the Canadian authorities have no control, which prevents this period from being
attributed to the Crown.131 This makes sense and reflects long-settled law that the Charter cannot
apply to the actions of foreign authorities.132
However, there is one controversy remaining on this matter. As noted above, in R. v. Barra
and Govindia133, the Court held that a 19-month extradition process in the case of the accused
Barra was a discrete event, except for a 4-month portion which was attributed to the Crown on the
basis that it had failed to demonstrate that it had proceeded with reasonable diligence in the
extradition process. While the Court mentions that “it is not the duty of this Court to micro-manage
the dates and every response time for [the extradition period]”134, it still deducted the periods where
the Crown was not actively pursuing extradition.
On the contrary, the Court in Prince stated that the Jordan framework – with its global
approach that does not focus on qualifying specific periods of the delay – prevents the courts from
dissecting the delay to determine if a faster extradition was possible.135 Thus, the Court disagreed
with Barra and concluded that the entire extradition process qualifies as a discrete event, inter alia
because it is not clear what period of time would be deemed reasonable in the extradition
context.136
Considering both decisions were rendered after Jordan and that they both come from the
same level of court, it is difficult at this point in time to evaluate which argument will prevail.
However, what is certain is that a delay caused by an extradition proceeding, whether partially or
totally, will qualify as an exceptional circumstance under the Jordan framework.

Conclusion
As the above description indicates, as far as being an exemplar of state practice under the
ICCPR, the manner in which Canada is administering the right to trial within a reasonable time is
fairly consistent with the overall parameters set by the Human Rights Committee. Authorities are
required to ensure, with reasonable diligence, that the period between charge and trial does not
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stretch on unnecessarily. This protects the interests of the individual but also serves important
public policy goals.
Assessing what is a “reasonable” time is a very contextual and fact-specific exercise, and
it is driven by the conduct of both the state and the individual. Practically speaking, this
highlights the importance of a robust regime of evidentiary disclosure to the accused by the state,
since the question of reasonability cannot be assessed by the courts in a vacuum. Factual parsing
is key to properly assessing delay.
As trite as it sounds, it is important to remember that this is a human right, and therefore
the analytical starting point is the duty of the state to administer the criminal process
appropriately and in a fair manner. As has been discussed here, this is where Canadian law falls
down in some places, since there has been a tendency on the courts to relax the Crown’s
obligation of diligence completely where the accused has deliberately attempted to frustrate a
police investigation by fleeing the country and/or evading the police. It is possible, and indeed
appropriate, to hold the accused to account for these actions, as he should not be able to
manufacture delay and then have this held against the Crown. However, it is against the entire
policy basis of the right itself to allow this to relieve the state of its duty of diligent pursuit. As
we have argued, the balance can be struck in a way that provides accountability for the accused’s
actions but ensures the state does not allow the prosecution to atrophy unnecessarily.
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